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Abstract
Islamic fundamentalist movements are inherently anti-system social movements. An anti-system social
movement is designed to criticize governmental institutions and the political mainstream while mobilizing
disaffected individuals against the existing sociopolitical and socioeconomic institutions. What is lacking
in the mindset of many Western politicians, practitioners, the media, and the general public is a basic
understanding of Islamic fundamentalism; specifically, the causes. This is the first quantitative analysis of
potential causes of Islamic fundamentalism. I have created a unique data set that contains every Islamic
fundamentalist group that is or has been in operation from 1970 through 2008. This fundamentalist data
set has a total number of 16,072 fundamentalist movements. I will utilize the negative binomial fixed
effects regression model and a comparison of each independent variable’s effect on the number of
fundamentalist movements by looking at each independent variable’s minimum, mean, and maximum
score.
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Peace and Conflict Studies
Islamic Fundamentalism: A Quantitative Analysis
D. Dustin Berna

Abstract
Islamic fundamentalist movements are inherently anti-system social movements. An antisystem social movement is designed to criticize governmental institutions and the political
mainstream while mobilizing disaffected individuals against the existing sociopolitical and
socioeconomic institutions. What is lacking in the mindset of many Western politicians,
practitioners, the media, and the general public is a basic understanding of Islamic
fundamentalism; specifically, the causes. This is the first quantitative analysis of potential
causes of Islamic fundamentalism. I have created a unique data set that contains every
Islamic fundamentalist group that is or has been in operation from 1970 through 2008. This
fundamentalist data set has a total number of 16,072 fundamentalist movements. I will utilize
the negative binomial fixed effects regression model and a comparison of each independent
variable’s effect on the number of fundamentalist movements by looking at each independent
variable’s minimum, mean, and maximum score.

Introduction
The field of Conflict Analysis and Resolution is one of the most unique fields found
within the social sciences in part because of its inherent multidisciplinary roots where
multiple academic schools of thought have found a common objective of analyzing and
resolving many types of conflicts. The Matrix of Conflict Analysis and Resolution is growing
and its scholarly canon is expanding with great robustness; however, there are voids. One
such gap in the literature is research that deals with the causes of Islamic fundamentalism.
To fully understand Islamic fundamentalism it is essential that we figure out its potential
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causes. Islamic fundamentalist movements are inherently anti-system social movements. An
anti-system social movement is designed to criticize governmental institutions and the
political mainstream while mobilizing disaffected individuals against the existing
sociopolitical and socioeconomic institutions. An anti-system fundamentalist movement does
this while basing its criticism in religion. Also, anti-system social movements are reactive in
nature and occur in reaction to events and forces in the socio-economic, political, and cultural
arenas. Islamic fundamentalism forms in reaction to and in defense against the results and
consequences of forced assimilation, modernization, industrialization, globalization,
Americanization, and westernization, all of which have penetrated the larger Islamic
community. There is no consensus as to what causes the rise of Islamic fundamentalism or
an explanation as to why some states have more Islamic fundamentalist movements than
other states. This article provides preliminary answers by quantitatively measuring an
Islamic-majority nation-state’s degree of fundamentalism in relation to conditions which can
cause social movement formation. To do this, Islamic fundamentalist movements are treated
as social movements. Classic social movement theory consists of four schools of thought:
resource mobilization theory, political process theory, Marxist theory, and new social
movement theory. The fundamental conditions associated with each classical social
movement school of thought have been quantified and are used as independent variables.
This article is divided into five parts. First, I look at the causes of Islamic
fundamentalism as explained by the existing literature. In the second section, I propose my
theory that Islamic fundamentalist movements are inherently social movements and are best
explained through an amalgamation of the four classic social movement schools of thought. I
also hypothesize that the fundamental conditions associated with each classical school of
thought are positively associated with the degree of Islamic fundamentalism. Third, I explain
my analytic design and rationale behind using the negative binomial fixed effects regression
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model and a comparison of each independent variable’s effect on the number of
fundamentalist movements by looking at each independent variable’s minimum, mean, and
maximum score. The fourth part is an explanation of my data and both independent and
dependent variables. As a dependent variable, I used a unique data set that contains every
Islamic fundamentalist group that is or has been in operation from 1970 through 2008. The
fundamentalist data set I created has a total N (total number of fundamentalist movements) of
16,072. Finally, I explain the results, which indicate a strong correlation between Islamic
fundamentalism and the fundamental conditions associated with the classical schools of
social movement thought.
The Causes of Islamic Fundamentalism
Scholars offer five significant reasons explaining the causes of Islamic
fundamentalism. First, some argue that worsening economics, unemployment, and poverty
facilitate fundamentalism (the socioeconomic arguments). A second prevalent reason found
in the literature is that cultural tension between Islam and the West, which is the result of
modernization, Westernization, and Americanization, is facilitating fundamentalism. Third,
many scholars argue that fundamentalism is a result of the Soviet Empire imploding and the
political/social vacuum left in its place. Fourth, some argue that individuals become Islamic
fundamentalists in personal times of crisis in order to be closer to God. Fifth, some of the
literature explains fundamentalism as the result of a specific catalyst, such as the Palestinian
refugee problem, the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the radicalization of Egyptian society, or the
assassination of Sadat.
The first prevalent argument explains the underpinning causes of Islamic
fundamentalism as directly related to socioeconomic issues and assumes that worsening
economies facilitate fundamentalism. Chibber (1996) attributes the electoral achievements of
fundamentalist political parties to national economic factors. Throughout the Muslim world,
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organized Muslim extremists have kept states’ infrastructures working during periods of
economic hardships or national disaster. Political alienation incited by economic deprivation
influence fundamentalist movements which may seek to rectify perceived or real alienation
through the creation of either armed or political groups and sometimes through both (Walz
1986; Keddie 1988, 2003; Jaber 1997; Saad-Ghorayeb 2002; and Mortimer 1991). However,
Grasso (1995) argues that Islamic fundamentalism is the result of more than just simple
economic factors and can be explained by Islamic social structure; specifically, the level of
development, degree of urbanization, the pattern of distribution of wealth and income, and
differences in patterns of consumption. These factors create a multilayered look into the role
economics and related factors play in the development of fundamentalist groups. Dillman
(1992) argues that in many post-colonial societies, a single party came to power following
independence from colonizing nations, and he asserts those parties instigated the movement
to gain independence from colonizers. However, as socioeconomic conditions worsen in
post-colonial nations, fundamentalist political parties arise and achieve significant electoral
success. Although post-colonial independence movements and subsequent economic
conditions influence the development of fundamentalist groups, Almond, Appleby, and Sivan
(2003) argue that the uneven distribution of economic development and natural resources in
fact are the root causes of fundamentalist group development. They assert that recessions,
depressions, inflation, strikes, unemployment, and famine create attitudes and grievances
expressed by feelings of relative deprivation among particular groups in the population
leading to a rise in fundamentalism.
A second prevalent argument in the literature is that Islamic fundamentalism is the
result of the loss of traditional Islamic culture because of Westernization, Americanization,
and modernization. Many scholars have explained the rise of religion as a political force
creating the tensions associated with modernization (Ayoob 1981; Dessouki 1982; Esposito
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1980; Keddie 1988; Lewis 1990, 1967;; Mortimer 1991). Pipe (1983) and Tibi (2002) argue
that Muslims suffer from a double crisis, which facilitates Islamic fundamentalism. First,
Muslims suffer from socioeconomic and political crises deriving from the imposed
integration of Islamic civilization into a world dominated by the West. Secondly, Muslims
suffer from an identity crisis brought on by exposure to cultural modernity. The general
feeling among Islamic fundamentalists is that since the Crusades, the Western world has
engaged in a campaign to destroy Islam. In response, Islamic fundamentalists have formed
groups as a method of standing up to the Western world (Zarzar 2001). Almond, Appleby
and Sivan (2003), and Wickham (2002) argue that it is imperative not to underestimate the
importance of Western imperialism in explaining the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. As
numerous scholars have cited, the disappearance of traditional Islamic civil society over the
last century via Western imperialism has led to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism (Weinberg
and Pedahzur 2004; Berman 2003).
The third explanation for the cause of Islamic fundamentalism is the implosion of the
Soviet Empire. With the end of the Cold War, Islamic fundamentalism emerged as a global
security issue that poses serious challenges to state authority in the Middle East (Khashan
2000). The demise of the bipolar international structure associated with the Cold War
facilitated the rise of Islamic fundamentalism because the two superpowers had effectively
contained the escalation of existing conflicts (Tibi 2002). The bipolar Cold War world was
synonymous with global stability; when the Cold War ended, that global stability evaporated.
During the Cold War, regional and domestic conflicts within the Islamic world were
subordinated via the American-Soviet rivalry. However, with the end of global bipolarity,
there is no adequate international political security structure to manage international changes
which resulted in the increase of Islamic fundamentalism (Horsman and Marshall 1994).
Hilal Khashan (1997) argues that the collapse of the Soviet Union contributed to Islamic
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militancy in three ways. First, extremists saw the fall communism as clear proof of the
unworkability of man-made laws. Second, the breakup of Yugoslavia, a by-product of the
Soviet collapse, triggered the Bosnia-Herzegovina War which led to the mass execution of
tens of thousands of Muslims, and Western governments did very little to stop Serbian ethnic
cleansing. As a result, much of the Islamic world became frustrated with Western apathy and
the hypocrisy of U.S. foreign policy as it relates to human rights. Third, the end of East-West
ideological rivalry created a vacuum in international relations whose balance hinged in
sustaining balanced conflict. The United States found itself without a major enemy. Finally,
Bernard Lewis (1990) argues that Islamic fundamentalism is the direct result of the Soviet
Union’s invasion into Afghanistan in 1979 and the formation of the Mujahedeen.
The fourth explanation of Islamic fundamentalism is interconnected with the
arguments above. The fourth explanation is that individuals turn to Islamic fundamentalism
in personal times of crisis and to be closer to God. Phebe Marr (1994) argues that when
facing serious socioeconomic problems, crises of cultural identity, government ineptitude,
and rapid and disruptive change, the Middle East has turned increasingly to Islam for solace
and solutions. Muslims are just like Christians or Jews, during hard times individuals turn to
their sacred teachings and religious leaders for guidance and solace.
The remaining explanations argue that fundamentalism is the result of an outside
catalyzing event. Specifically, Islamic fundamentalism is the direct result of the
displacement of Palestinians after the establishment of the state of Israel. According to
Khashan (1997), Islamic fundamentalism results from the decline of Arab nationalism which
took its most significant blow after the Arabs lost the 1967 Six-Day War. In fact, the
Egyptian Brotherhood claims that the lack of spirituality caused Egypt’s defeat. However,
Voll (2004a, 2004b) argues that the birth of modern Islamic fundamentalism began in Egypt
in 1928 with the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood, which was the result of
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socioeconomic inequality facilitated by imperialism. Lia (1998), Sagiv (1995), and Kepel
(1985a, 1985b) argue that modern Islamic fundamentalism emerged after the 1981
assassination of President Anwar Sadat. The assassins were identified as Islamic
fundamentalists, members of a group called al-Jihad, who hoped to spark an Islamic
revolution in Egypt. Finally, many scholars have argued that Islamic fundamentalism is the
result of the Iranian Islamic Revolution. This position has been particularly argued by
Abrahamian (1982, 1989, 1993), Khomeini (1989), and Keddie (1988, 2003). Each of these
scholars systematically notes the Iranian Revolution’s success as the direct result of the
Shah’s restrictive political institutions that started opening (or cracking) religious ideology,
socio-economic inequality, and poverty.
Social Movements and Fundamentalism
The best way to understand the causes of Islamic fundamentalism is to view
fundamentalist movements as social movements. Each classic social movement school of
thought has competing assumptions associated with the formation and duration of social
movements. Interestingly, each of these conditions is positively associated with the degree of
fundamentalism as measured by the number of fundamentalist movements found within
majority Islamic-based nation-states. The fundamental conditions associated with each of the
classic schools of thought include the elements found in resource mobilization theory,
socioeconomic structural inequality found in Marxism, political institutions and the
sociopolitical structures found in political process theory, and the post-modern ideas found in
the new social movement theory.
The first group of conditions are those associated with Marxism. Karl Marx (1978)
had a legitimate argument when he asserted that when the state oppresses, enslaves, and
ignores the masses long enough, they will revolt. Marx was correct when he argued that
individuals get involved in collective action when their social class has reached its breaking
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point; they will then unite against their antagonists and forcibly change both the
socioeconomic and sociopolitical institutions of the state. However, it did not occur to Marx
to ask what makes individuals engage in collective action; he simply assumed that collective
action was a direct result of society’s structural development rather than individual choice.
This is a legitimate argument; however, it does not explain why Muslims join fundamentalist
movements. In this aspect, the resource mobilization theorists (the second classic social
movement theory) are correct in their critique of the Marxists; resources, of both the group
and at state levels, are imperative for a movement’s formation and success. What makes
resource mobilization theory different from Marxist explanations of social movements is that
it focuses on societal breakdown(s). In order to mobilize politically, groups require resources
and they must mobilize these resources, that is, use them or put them into effect (McCarthy
and Zald 1977; Tilly 1978; Freeman 1979). I define resources here as money and population;
however, I deviate from the resource mobilization theorists by also including education as a
resource. Also, resource mobilization theory is based on the idea that participants in social
movements are inherently rational.
The third classical social movement theory is political process. Political process
theory is a response to resource mobilization theory. Political process theory criticizes
resource mobilization theory for neglecting the fact that social movements develop and act in
both sociopolitical arenas and governmental institutions which significantly influence the
trajectories of social movements (Eisinger 1974; Kitschelt 1986; McAdam 1982, 1986, 1988;
and Tarrow 1989). Political process theorists argue that resource mobilization theory falls
short because it assumes that social organization, integration, and resources, rather than
grievances, discontent, and sociopolitical institutions are most important to a social
movement’s participants. In other words, resource mobilization theorists are putting the cart
before the horse; a movement cannot have resources until it has grievances. The foundation
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of political process theory is that political institutions play an integral role in social
movement development.
The final classical social movement theory is the new social movement theory. New
social theory emerged in the advanced industrial world after the social protests of the 1960s
and 1970s subsided. New social movement theorists argue that recent social movements
represent an entirely new form of social protest and reflect new goals and values. New social
movements are interested in intangible goods that would enhance the quality of life for all
sectors of society (Kitschelt 1981; Melucci 1996; Offe 1985). New social movement
theorists assert that one of the most important differences between new and old movements
lies in the tactics that each relies on to achieve its goals.
Hypotheses
Based on the literature discussing each of these social movement theories, I derived
the following four hypotheses to examine how conditions associated with each social
movement school of thought influence the degree of fundamentalism:
H1: Socioeconomic inequality as described by Marxist social movement theory is positively
associated with the number of Islamic fundamentalist groups present within the nation-state.
H2: Resources as described by resource mobilization social movement theorists are
positively associated with the number and success of Islamic fundamentalist groups present
within the nation-state.
H3: The degree of openness of political institutions as described by the political process
social movement theorists has an inverted-U shaped relationship with the number and
success of Islamic fundamentalist movements; the number of movements should be the
strongest in systems which are neither highly democratic nor highly autocratic.
H4: Ideas as described by the new social movement theorists are positively associated with
the number and success of Islamic fundamentalist groups present within the nation-state
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Analytic Design
The goal of this article is to determine the conditions that are influencing the number
of Islamic fundamentalist movements in Islamic-majority nation-states by utilizing
quantitative methods. To do this, I utilize the negative binomial fixed effects regression
model and a comparison of each independent variable’s effect on the number of
fundamentalist movements by looking at each independent variable’s minimum, mean, and
maximum score. My findings show that each of the social movement conditions is positively
associated with the degree of fundamentalism, as measured by the number of Islamic
fundamentalist movements. My data on the number of fundamentalist movements are in the
form of yearly counts; therefore, I use negative binomial regression. The negative binomial
model incorporates observed and unobserved heterogeneity into the conditional mean (Long
1997). Thus, the conditional variance of my dependent variable (number of fundamentalist
movements) becomes larger than its conditional mean, which remains unchanged. Negative
binomial regressions are designed to handle continuous variables with distributions
containing zero values and large positive skews, which explain my fundamentalist data.
According to Robinson, Lawton, and Taylor (2003) negative binomial regressions effectively
control for over dispersion by adding a stochastic component to the model. If the numbers of
observations within a year are not independent, the variance may be greater than the mean. If
such an over dispersion exists, as it does in counting fundamentalist movements, negative
binomial models are more appropriate (Cameron 1990), but pooling multiple observations
over time for each fundamentalist group violates the independence assumptions required for
unbiased parameter estimates. This can be corrected by clustering data through random
effects (Guo 1996) or fixed effects models.
Often, as in my data, the variance exceeds the conditional mean, resulting in what is
called over dispersion. The negative-binomial model actually accounts for over dispersion.
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It is essentially a negative binomial model (a variant of the Poisson model) that is commonly
used to deal with over dispersion parameter that varies across states. Hausman, Hall, and
Griliches (1984) suggested further refinement that starts with the negative multinomial model
and makes additional assumptions about the distribution of the random effect that effectively
allow the over distribution parameter to vary across both regions and time. This approach,
called the negative-binomial model with random effects, does not work with my data. After
running the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects, I was able to
determine that random effects models were inappropriate; therefore, I decided to run fixed
effects models. Standard negative binomial models assume that regression coefficients are
fixed between groups and that error terms are not correlated. These models are inadequate
for complex sampling designs, such as my fundamentalist movement data. Finally, I used the
Xtnbreg regression command in Stata. Xtnbreg is a convenience command for populationaveraged models by using xtgee, family (nbreg) link (log) to obtain estimates.
Data and Variables
Dependent Variable
I have created a data set that contains every Islamic fundamentalist movement that is,
or has been, in operation from 1970 through 2008. If the group, political party, or issueoriented movement meets the following conditions it was included in my data set: First, the
movement, group, political party, or issue-oriented militant movement must be non-secular in
its beliefs, ideas, or dogmas. Second, it also must encourage, sponsor, or condone the lack of
separation of church and state within government, state institutions, education, or educational
institutions. Third, for a movement to be considered fundamentalist it must have sociopolitical objectives, and not just religious ones. The theoretical justification behind this
definition of a fundamentalist movement must be broad enough to encompass multiple types
of movements; thus I use words such as group, political party and issue-oriented militant
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movement. This terminology in broad enough to catch most organized movements of people
without excluding any. No fundamentalist movement is secular and their proponents do not
have to believe in the lack of separation between church and governmental institutions.
Finally, to separate religious movements from fundamentalist movements, I note that the
movements must have socio-political objectives and not just religious ones.
In the fundamentalist data set I created, there is a total N (total number of
fundamentalist movement-years) of 16,072. I obtained this number by taking each Islamic
nation-state and counting every fundamentalist movement present for every year, and then
summing the years. However, a problem that has arisen with counting the number of
fundamentalist movements is that the size of the fundamentalist movement is not taken into
account; this could have significant ramifications for the reliability of my data. To rectify
this, I counted large movements (over 900 members) three times. I chose 900 because most
small fundamentalist movements throughout the Islamic world have less than 400 active
members and medium-sized Islamic movements have no more than 700 members.
Furthermore, based on my findings there are virtually no differences between a small and
medium sized fundamentalist movements. However, there are significant differences
between small or medium movements and that of a large movements, specifically influence,
membership, resources, and power.
Independent Variables
I only looked at nation-states with a 50% or more Muslim population. All population
statistics were obtained from the Department of State’s Country Study webpage. This is a 39year study covering the years from 1970-2008. The following nation-states are included in
this paper: Iran, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain (1971), Bangladesh (1972), Brunei (1984),
Djibouti (1977), Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Iraq, Mauritania,
Morocco, Qatar, Pakistan (1972), Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tajikistan (1991), Tunisia,
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Turkey, Turkmenistan (1991), United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan (1991), Yemen (1990),
Kazakhstan (1991), Eritrea (1991), Ethiopia, Tanzania, Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan, and
Kyrgyzstan (1991).
The following are the total numbers of fundamentalist movements in each nation-state
included in this paper. The total number of movements is shown with the number of unique
groups in parenthesis: Iran 1329 (76); Algeria 452 (35); Azerbaijan 8 (4); Bahrain 212 (12);
Bangladesh 803 (39); Brunei 0; Djibouti 0; Egypt 616 (45); Indonesia 1125 (66); Jordan 434
(22); Kuwait 22 (6); Oman 35 (2); Saudi Arabia 421 (37); Syria 872 (35); Tajikistan 168 (9);
Tunisia 159 (9); Turkey 435 (25); Turkmenistan 7 (2); United Arab Emirates 32 (2);
Uzbekistan 96 (8); Yemen 208 (17); Kazakhstan 24 (5); Eritrea 30 (5); Lebanon 1748 (92);
Libya 542 (24); Iraq 1283 (149); Mauritania 49 (3); Morocco 224 (10); Qatar 2 (1); Pakistan
1203 (67); Ethiopia 437 (7); Afghanistan 728 (27); Somalia 349 (10); Sudan 667 (29);
Kyrgyzstan 81 (4); Palestine 1261 (62).
Outside Ideological Force
What I also add here is the presence of an outside ideological force. The presence of
outside ideological force plays a significant role in determining how many fundamentalist
movements a state will have. There are three significant outside ideological forces in the
Islamic world: Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. Iran and Saudi Arabia do what I
call group facilitate. Group facilitate is when Iran or Saudi Arabia operates clandestine
operations within different Islamic states via sponsoring domestic movements found within
other states in order to facilitate their own interests and force other governments into
compliance. The United States, on the other hand, does not group facilitate; instead, it
influences the state leadership via economic and/or military aid and the presence of U.S.
troops. Theoretically, American ideological influence is inherently different than that of
Iranian or Saudi Arabian. American ideological inference is top-down, meaning the aid is
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given to the state, not individual Islamic groups or movements. On the other hand, Iranian
and Saudi Arabian ideological influence is, for the most part, bottom-up; they give aid
directly to movements. There are a few exceptions to my argument concerning the U.S. and
its top-down influence, specifically the Taliban and Mujahedeen in Afghanistan and the
current aid it gives to Sunni groups in the Iraq.
During the last twenty-nine years, the international community has seen Iran emerge
as an ideological hegemon that has significantly influenced domestic politics and domestic
development of Shiite Muslims. Furthermore, during the same period, the international
community has seen Saudi Arabia achieve the same ideological hegemonic standing as Iran
but with the Sunni Muslims. Both enjoy a unique position in the world of Islam due to their
strategic locations, natural resources, and historical and cultural role in the development of
the Islamic civilization. I theoretically define a significant outside ideological force as an
outside influence that meets each of the six criteria: firstly, the outside support must be in the
form of financial, military, or humanitarian aid from a state other than where the
fundamentalist group is located. Secondly, there must be a physical presence of the
ideological force within the country via state representatives, scholars, religious leaders, state
sponsored militia, military, or any group representing the ideological state. Or, the members
of the fundamentalist group must be trained in or educated in the foreign state. Thirdly to be
considered significant, more than one group must receive the above explained influence.
Fourthly, the ideological force cannot be working with, for, or influenced by the state in
which the fundamentalist group is working. Fifthly, the ideological force must influence a
fundamentalist group for two or more consecutive years. Sixthly, the United States
ideological influence is excluded from this variable because U.S. influence is captured in the
presence of U.S. troops and U.S. aid.
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The Marxist variables included here are the nation-state’s total percentage of the
population’s poverty level and unemployment. The World Bank’s data on unemployment and
poverty are very limited. To rectify this, I have used the CIA World Fact Book From 19892007. For data prior to 1989 I used numerous sources which include books and articles
concerning Middle Eastern poverty and unemployment. The Resource Mobilization
variables include the total population (thousands), total GDP (millions of dollars), total ODA
(millions of dollars), total American financial aid (millions of dollars), and secondary school
enrollment (ratio of the total enrolment in secondary education). All data from the above
independent variables were obtained from the World Bank’s World data set. The Political
Process variables include the polity variables from the Polity IV Project, specifically,
Executive Recruitment, Executive Constraints, and Political Competition. Also used to
measure Political Process are the variables from the CIRI Human Rights Data Project and
they include: Political Rights, Extrajudicial Killings, Disappearances, Political
Imprisonment, and Torture. The following variables were used to measure the post-modern
ideas associated with New Social Movement theory: Freedom of Speech, Freedom of
Religion, Freedom of Movement, Freedom of Assembly and Association, Women’s Political
Rights, and Workers Rights; all of which were obtained from the CIRI data project. Finally,
the presence of an Outside Ideological Force which is a dichotomous variable that looks at
whether there is a significant outside ideological force present. Also used to measure ideas
are the number of United States troops in each nation-state included here (data was obtained
from the Global U.S. Troop Development).
Results
Marxist Theory
The socioeconomic inequality variables associated with Marxist theory suggest a
positive and significant relationship between socioeconomic inequality and the number of
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fundamentalist movements within the nation-state. The percentage of the total population
within the nation-state living below the poverty is positively associated with an increase in
the number of fundamentalist movements. Also, the percentage of the total population
unemployed within the nation-state is positively associated with an increase in the number of
fundamentalist movements. Given these results, we see that socioeconomic inequality is a
key predictor of fundamentalist movements, thus helping to prove hypothesis number one,
which argues socioeconomic inequality as described by the Marxist social movement theory
is positively associated with the number and success of Islamic fundamentalist groups present
within the nation-state.
For every percentage increase in total poverty there was a .008 increase in Islamic
fundamentalism. This indicates that states with more poverty will have more Islamic
fundamentalist movements. To confirm this, I looked at the poverty variable’s effect on the
number of fundamentalist movements by setting the variable at its minimum, mean, and
maximum score. When the percentage of the total population living in poverty was set at its
minimum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 3.89, down from the average
of 5.06. When set at its maximum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is
13.34, up from the average of 5.06. These results show that states with significant poverty
have a significant increase in the number of fundamentalist movements.
The total percentage of the state’s population living in poverty only represents half of
the significant variables that make up the Marxist arm of my fundamentalist labyrinth; the
second half of it consists of the total percentage of the state’s unemployed population. Just as
with the total poverty level, the unemployment coefficients were positive and significant.
This indicates that unemployment is positively associated with an increase in the number of
fundamentalist movements. As the percent of the nation-state’s unemployed population
increases, the number of fundamentalist movements within the nation-state also increases.
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The model results indicate that every percentage increase in total unemployment was a .011
significance level. To confirm this, I examine the poverty variable’s effect on the number of
fundamentalist movements by setting the variable at its minimum, mean, and maximum score
which indicates the number of fundamentalist movements expected at each setting. When the
percentage of the total unemployed was set at its minimum, the expected number of
fundamentalist movements is 5.07, up from the average of 5.06. When set at its maximum,
the expected number of fundamentalist groups is 9.07, up from the average of 5.06. These
results are very interesting because set at its minimum, the expected number of
fundamentalist movements is still larger than the mean; this indicates that unemployment has
an effect on the number of fundamentalist movements.
Resource Mobilization Theory
Regarding Resource Mobilization theory, my results suggest a positive and significant
relationship between resources and the number of fundamentalist movements within the
nation state. Interestingly, my results indicate that only total population and education were
positive and highly significant. In other words, as the total population increases so do the
total number of fundamentalist movements. Also, as the percentage of the total population’s
education level increases, so does the number of fundamentalist movements. Given these
results we see that resources are a key predictor of fundamentalist movements, thus helping
to prove hypotheses number two, which argues: Resources as described by the resource
mobilization social movement theory is positively associated with the number and success
Islamic fundamentalist groups present within the nation-state.
The population coefficients were positive and significant in all regressions when I ran
the model using the logged value of the total population. This indicates that the total
population was positively associated with an increase in the number of fundamentalist
movements. As the size of the nation-state’s population increases by ten thousand, the
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number of fundamentalist movements increases by .0001046; this increase is relatively small.
These results suggest that increases in a nation-state’s population facilitate more
fundamentalist movements. Alone, these results do not indicate a significant amount of
information. However, taken with the other variables associated with resource mobilization
theory, it is apparent that resources are positively associated with fundamentalism. I looked
at the total population variable’s effect on the number of fundamentalist movements by
setting the variable at its minimum, mean, and maximum score which indicates the number of
fundamentalist groups expected at each setting. When the state’s total population was set at
its minimum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 5.34, down from the
average of 5.06. When set at its maximum, the expected number of fundamentalist
movements is 13.8, up from the average of 5.06. These results further confirm all previous
results and indicate that as the state’s population increases, so do the number of Islamic
fundamentalist movements.
The education/school enrollment coefficients were positive and significant. The
education coefficients were significantly larger than that of the population variables. The
results reveal that for every percentage increase in school enrollment there was a significance
level of .003. These results indicate that education was positively associated with an increase
in the number of fundamentalist movements. In other words, the more educated the
population, the more fundamentalist movements there will be within the nation-state. Just as
with the state’s total population, I looked at the education level variable’s effect on the
number of fundamentalist movements by setting the variable at its minimum, mean, and
maximum score that indicates the number of fundamentalist movements expected at each
setting. When secondary school enrollment was set at its minimum, the expected number of
fundamentalist movements is 4.08, down from the average of 5.06. When set at its
maximum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 8.73, up from the average of
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5.06. These results further confirm all previous results and indicate that as population and
education increase, so do the number of Islamic fundamentalist movements.
Political Process Theory
The results associated the conditions associated with Political Process theory are
twofold. First, there are two linear relationships between perfect autocracies and the perfect
democracies and the number of fundamentalist groups. The definition of a perfect autocracy
is obtained from the Polity IV data set that ranges from a -10 (a perfect autocracy) and +10 (a
perfect democracy). These findings indicate that both perfect democracies and perfect
autocracies experience lower numbers of fundamentalist movements, whereas states with
opening political institutions experience more fundamentalist movements. When
governments disdainfully kill or torture their citizens with no regard to basic human rights,
there will be a decrease in the number Islamic fundamentalist groups. On the other hand, the
more freedom of speech a nation-state has, the fewer fundamentalist movements. Second,
there is an inverted-U shaped relationship with the number of Islamic fundamentalist
movements. The number of movements is the strongest in systems which are neither perfect
democracies nor perfect autocracies. In order to prove hypotheses number three: The degree
of openness of political institutions as described by the political process social movement
theorists has an inverted-U shaped relationship with the number and success of Islamic
fundamentalist movements; the number of movements should be the strongest in system which
are neither highly democratic nor highly autocratic, I ran different sets of models utilizing
the CIRI human rights data and the Polity IV data sets.
Extrajudicial killings are negative and significant, as expected. Extrajudicial killing is
the killing of citizens within the perspective nation-state by government officials without due
process of law. These killings may result from the deliberate, illegal, and excessive use of
lethal force by police, security forces, or other agents of the state whether against criminal
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suspects, detainees, prisoners, or others. The model indicates that the more individuals a state
kills, there will be a .05 decrease in the significance level of the number of fundamentalist
movements. From here, I looked at the extrajudicial killing variable’s effect on the number
of fundamentalist movements by setting the variable at its minimum, mean, and maximum
score that indicates the number of fundamentalist groups expected at each setting. When
extrajudicial killings were set at its minimum, the expected number of fundamentalist
movements is 7.33, up from the average of 5.06. When set at its maximum, the expected
number of fundamentalist movements is 3.42, down from the average of 5.06. These results
confirm that the more citizens the state either murders or facilitates the murder of, there will
be a significant decline in the number of fundamentalist movements.
State sponsored acts of torture were also negative and significant, as expected. State
sponsored acts of torture refer to the purposeful inflicting of extreme pain, whether mental or
physical, by government officials or by private individuals at the instigation of government
officials. Torture includes the use of physical and other force by police and prison guards
that is cruel, inhumane, or degrading. This also includes deaths in custody due to negligence
by government officials. The results reveal that the more individuals a state tortures, there
will be a significance level decrease in the number of fundamentalist movements of .11. I
looked at the state sponsored acts of torture variable’s effect on the number of fundamentalist
movements by setting the variable at its minimum, mean, and maximum score which
indicates the number of fundamentalist movements expected at each setting. When state
sponsored acts of torture were set at its minimum the expected number of fundamentalist
movements is 6.28, up from the average of 5.06. When set at its maximum, the expected
number of movements is 5.49, down from the average of 5.06. These results confirm that the
more the state tortures its citizens, the fewer fundamentalist movements.
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Thus far, I have not proven an inverted-U relationship exists between political
institutions and the number of fundamentalist movements. I have shown that two linear
relationships exist between very perfect democracies/autocracies and the number of
fundamentalist movements. These findings indicate that both perfect democracies and
perfect autocracies experience lower numbers of fundamentalist movements, while states
with opening political institutions experience more fundamentalist movements. However, I
suspect a much more complex relationship between political institutions and Islamic
fundamentalism. Specifically, an inverted-U relationship; that is, there will be more Islamic
fundamentalist movements in nation-states that are not either perfect democracies or perfect
autocracies. According to Davenport and Armstrong (2004, 545), polity stands as the best
comparative indicator of procedural democracy because of its incorporation of structural
constraints on political participation and contestation. It is also one of the most utilized
comparative measures of democracy and the best variable to determine inverted-U shaped
relationships. Therefore, I squared all variables associated with polity. If the polity variables
have a significant positive effect and the squared term has a significant negative effect, then I
prove that an inverted-U relationship exists. My polity variable was not significant. This
does not necessarily disprove my hypothesis because two of the three multi-dimensional
polity variables and their square terms were significant.
Concerning the multidimensional polity variables, executive recruitment was positive
and significant. Executive recruitment, which was first conceptualized by Eckstein and Gurr
(1975), involves the ways in which social superordinants come to occupy their positions of
political authority. In other words, how open, institutionalized and competitive are the
political institutions that are used in selecting political leaders. The executive recruitment
score ranges from 1 to 8, 1 being the most restricted and 8 being the most open. My analysis
of executive recruitment provides evidence that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship
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between the openness of the political system and the number of fundamentalist groups.
Executive recruitment is significantly positive while its squared term is negatively significant,
proving that an inverted-U relationship exists between executive recruitment and the number
of fundamentalist movements present within the nation-state. In other words, the relationship
between fundamentalism and political institutions is nonlinear; political systems with open
political institutions facilitate fundamentalism. The executive recruitment coefficient results
reveal that the more politically free a state is, the number of fundamentalist movement
significance level increases by .013. On the other hand, the squared executive recruitment
coefficients reveal that the more politically closed a state is, there will be a decrease in the
number of fundamentalist movements of .023.
Executive constraints were positive and significant and refer to the extent of
institutional constraints on the decision-making powers of the chief executive. The degree of
checks and balances between the veto players in the government is coded on a 7-point scale
which ranges from the unlimited executive authority (1) to executive subordination (7).
Under unlimited executive authority, there would be only one veto player and under
executive subordination there would be numerous veto players. My analysis of executive
constraints provides evidence that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the
openness of the political system and the number of fundamentalist groups. Executive
constraints are positively significant while its squared term is negatively significant, proving
that an inverted-U relationship between executive constraints and the number of
fundamentalist movements present within the nation-state. As for the executive constraint
coefficients, the results reveal that the more veto players in a state means there will be a
significance level increase in the number of fundamentalist movements of .023. On the other
hand, the squared executive constraint coefficients reveal that more veto players in a state
will cause a decrease in the number of fundamentalist movements of .002.
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The results of my executive constraints and executive recruitment variables were
similar to that of Regan and Henderson (2002) and Fein (1995), who found that there would
be more repression in the middle of the political spectrum and that both democracies and
autocracies experience lower levels of repression while semi-democracies experience more
fundamentalist groups. I have proven that my inverted-U hypothesis is valid and there will
be a significant increase in the number of fundamentalist movements in opening political
systems, just as the political process theorist theory predicts.
New Social Movement Theory
The post-modern ideas associated with the New Social Movement theory, results suggest a
positive and significant relationship between ideas and the number of fundamentalist
movements within the nation state; specifically, religious ideas or ideas associated with an
outside ideological force. Interestingly, my results indicate that the presences of an outside
ideological force, freedom of speech, and freedom of religion are significant. Given these
results we see that ideas are a key predictor of fundamentalist movements, thus helping to
prove hypotheses number four, which argues: Ideas as described by the new social movement
theorists are positively associated with the number and success Islamic fundamentalist
groups present within the nation-state.
The results reveal that if there is a presence of an outside ideological force, there is an
increase in the number of fundamentalist movements of .35. To confirm this, I looked at the
outside ideological force variable’s effect on the number of fundamentalist movements by
setting the variable at its minimum, mean, and maximum score that indicates the number of
fundamentalist movements expected at each setting. When the variable is set at its minimum,
the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 4.61, up from the average of 5.06.
When set at its maximum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 11.0, up
from the average of 5.06. These results are very interesting because set at its maximum, the
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expected number of fundamentalist movements is twice as much as it is when set at the mean;
this and the above statistical results indicate that the presence of an outside ideological force
is a significant determinant in the number of fundamentalist movements. There are three
significant outside ideological forces in the Islamic world that operate within Islamic nationstates: Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. As I explained before, theoretically,
American ideological influence is inherently different than either Iranian or Saudi Arabian.
For the most part, the outside ideological variable only incorporates the influence of Iran or
Saudi Arabia. U.S. ideological influence was excluded from this variable but captured with
two additional variables: U.S. aid and the presence of U.S. troops. In not in a single model
was U.S. aid or the presence of U.S. troops significant.
Religious freedom is positive and significant. Religious freedom measures the extent
to which individuals living within the nation-state are able to exercise and practice their own
religious beliefs without government restrictions. When governments restrict religious
freedom, there is an increase in the number Islamic fundamentalist movements. The results
reveal that if the state restricts religious freedom then there will be a .0014 significance level.
From here, I looked at the freedom of religion variable’s effect on the number of
fundamentalist groups by setting the variable at its minimum, mean, and maximum score that
indicates the number of fundamentalist movements expected at each setting. When religious
freedom was set at its minimum the expected number of fundamentalist groups is 5.81, up
from the average of 5.06. When set at its maximum, the expected number of fundamentalist
movements is 4.77, down from the average of 5.06. These results further confirm all
previous results and indicate that as the state restricts religious freedom, individuals will turn
to fundamentalist movements.
Freedom of speech is negative and significant, as expected. Freedom of speech
measures the extent to which the government censors an individual’s freedoms of speech and
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press. When governments restrict freedom of speech we see a decrease in the number Islamic
fundamentalist movements by .019. In other words, in nation-states with more freedom of
speech and press, there will be more ideas and thus more fundamentalist movements. The
results reveal that if the state restricts freedom of speech, then there will be a significance
level decrease of in the number of fundamentalist movements of .09. From here, I looked at
the freedom of speech variable’s effect on the number of fundamentalist movements by
setting the variable at its minimum, mean, and maximum score that indicates the number of
fundamentalist movements expected at each setting. When freedom of speech was set at its
minimum, the expected number of fundamentalist movement is 5.18, up from the average of
5.06. When set at its maximum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 5.42,
up from the average of 5.06.
Conclusion
Islamic fundamentalist movements are inherently anti-system social movements. An
anti-system social movement is designed to criticize governmental institutions and the
political mainstream while mobilizing disaffected individuals against the existing
sociopolitical and socioeconomic institutions. An anti-system fundamentalist movement does
this while basing its criticism on religion. What is lacking in the mindset of many Western
politicians, practitioners, and the general public is a basic understanding of the causes of
Islamic fundamentalism. This paper helps rectify this by quantitatively analyzing the causes
of Islamic fundamentalist movements. As a dependent variable, I used a unique data set that
contains every Islamic fundamentalist group that is or has been in operation from 1970
through 2008. As independent variables I quantified the fundamental conditions associated
with each of the classic social movement theoretical schools of thought and my results
indicates that each are positively associated with the number of Islamic fundamentalist
movements found within Islamic-Majority nation states.
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To fully understand Islamic fundamentalism it is essential that we figure out its
potential causes. Islamic fundamentalist movements are inherently anti-system social
movements. An anti-system social movement is designed to criticize governmental
institutions and the political mainstream while mobilizing disaffected individuals against the
existing sociopolitical and socioeconomic institutions. An anti-system fundamentalist
movement does this while basing its criticism in religion. Furthermore, it is becoming
extremely difficult to determine the point of demarcation between international relations and
comparative politics and no phenomena blurs this point more than the rise and actions of
Islamic fundamentalists. Currently, Islamic fundamentalism is the greatest threat to the
international community and, arguably, the negative results of liberalism, globalization, and
the Americanization of global politics have facilitated the growth and success of such
movements. The study of social movements is a major subfield in comparative politics, and
the rise of Islamic fundamentalism is the most recent of the social movements. The global
effects of fundamentalism and their acts of terror have a major impact on the global economy
and the state which inherently impacts international relations. This latest threat to the
harmony of the international system is created via domestic political systems and is a direct
result of the foundations of comparative politics. This paper further blurred the point of
demarcation between international relations and comparative politics and in doing so has
added to the field of Conflict Analysis and Resolution.
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